Scientific Surveys Ltd The Premiere Pipeline Portal
SSL Home About SSL SSL Links Contact Us Feedback SSL Store
Journal of Pipeline Engineering - Issue Details
Date: 9/2008
Volume Number: 7

Table of Contents
View Archives >>
Table of Contents

The skills crisis in the pipeline sector of the oil and gas business
Author: Professor Phil Hopkins
Purchase Article at PipeData:
An ICDA case study: a 43-year-old sour gas pipeline
Author: Theo Abels
Secondary authors: Nguyen Bich
Purchase Article at PipeData:
Emerging techniques for enhanced assessment and analysis of dents
Author: S J Dawson
Secondary authors: A Russell and A Patterson
Purchase Article at PipeData:
Pipelining liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
Author: Dr Mo Mohitpour
Secondary authors: Andrew Jenkins and Tom Babuk
Purchase Article at PipeData:
A methodology to estimate failure rates of multiple pipeline systems from historical failure data
Author: Dr L Alfonso
Secondary authors: Dr F Caleyo, A Alcántara, and Dr J M Hallen
Purchase Article at PipeData:


Turkey pushes new pipeline WRITING IN A RECENT edition of Energy Daily (, Washington, US, -based John Daly points out that in the current “superheated” global energy market, with the oil price rising more than five-fold since 2000, the race is on world-wide to bring more crude to market, with many previously moribund pipeline projects being dusted off. Turkey, which currently imports about 90% of its oil consumption of its daily 724,400brl/d requirements, primarily from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Russia, not only is competing fiercely for a share of the imminent Iraq oil patch, but is also making every effort to position itself as the region’s pre-eminent energy transport hub. For the energy-hungry world market, Turkey is already a key player as an important energy hub, for two reasons: the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles), currently the world’s busiest maritime Straits, whose volume of traffic is exceeded only by the Straits of Malacca; and the $3.6-billion, 1747-km long Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The Turkish Straits now carry three times the traffic of the Suez Canal: according to Turkish maritime authorities, tankers of 200,000 tons or more transit the Bosporus every 10 to 20 minutes around the clock. In 2006, over 36,000 vessels transited the Straits, with tankers carrying over 140 million tons of oil. The passage poses significant environmental and safety risks to Istanbul, whose population makes it one of Europe’s largest cities, and unique in that no other European city has volatile cargo crossing within touching distance of the city each day. The Turkish government in Ankara is increasingly unhappy about this, particularly as – under the terms of the 1936 Montreaux Convention – the Straits are an international waterway and Turkey is unable to collect transit revenues. Turkey’s other contribution to global energy security is the BTC pipeline, which has a projected lifespan of 40 years. BTC currently carries about 700,000brl/d, and next year, when it begins flowing at normal capacity, it will transport 1m brl/d. BTC has provided a cash bonanza for Turkey in transit fees, as the pipeline traverses 1070km of Turkish territory. Last month Energy and Natural Resources Minister Hilmi Guler said that BTC transit revenues had earned Turkey $2 billion from transporting 378m brl of Azeri oil, an amount certain to increase next year when BTC achieves full capacity and its annual projected throughput is slated to rise to 200 million tons of crude. But Turkey has another pipeline project closer to its heart, which will pump an equivalent amount of crude to Ceyhan entirely across Turkish territory. The 544-km, $1.5-billion Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline (SCP), also known as the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, was first proposed in 2004. As envisaged, SCP will ship an initial 1 million bpd to Ceyhan, with plans eventually to raise its capacity to 1.5 million bpd by 2010. Where would the crude for Samsun-Ceyhan come from? The short answer is Kazakhstan, which is currently forced to use the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, terminating at Russia’s Novorossiisk port on the Sea of Azov, for the bulk of its exports. Turkey already has a toehold in Almaty, as its Calik Enerji is a partner with Italy’s ENI, a major investor in Kazakhstan’s massive Kashagan offshore Caspian development. Four years ago Calik Enerji began promoting the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline. While Ankara is actively soliciting Kazakh crude Russia, faced with its own transportation bottlenecks, might be persuaded to use the pipeline as well. For Turkey, Samsun-Ceyhan would be a double blessing. Turkey would be the sole collector of transit fees, unlike BTC, where it shares revenue with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Furthermore, Samsun-Ceyhan could alleviate a significant portion of the Bosporus-Dardanelles tanker traffic. The Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline could also have geostrategic implications far beyond Turkey. On 24 October, 2007, Mr Guler said a subsea Mediterranean extension of the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline could be used for oil shipments to Israel. One of Turkey’s major problems in the past for major energy projects has been finding international partners and funding. This will not be the case with the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline, as Royal Dutch Shell is to sign an agreement to become a partner by buying shares of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline Co (TAPCO), a 50/50 joint venture established by Calik Enerji and ENI to build, own, and operate the pipeline. SCP will have the full support of Ankara for two reasons, the first of which is the revenue stream generated by transit fees. More important for the Turkish government, however, is the impact SCP will have on tanker traffic through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, known collectively as the Turkish Straits, the sole maritime channel between the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Tankers transiting the Turkish Straits now carry 120m brl/yr of crude oil. As the Bosporus bisects Istanbul, with a population of 11.8 million, and narrows in places to less than 800m, municipal authorities are horrified at the potential consequences of a tanker accident. Without SCP, tanker traffic is expected to exceed 250m brl/yr in the next decade, while analysts predict tanker traffic in the Turkish Straits would drop by 50% percent when SCP becomes operational. The United States is also backing SCP, which it sees as diminishing Russia’s importance in European politics. In a rare instance of US-Russian agreement, as SCP can be used for Russian exports, the Kremlin’s opposition to the project is likely to be less pronounced than on other projects. While Russia is loath to relinquish its grip on Kazakh exports, use of SCP would still allow Russia to collect its transit fees from the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s trunk line to Novorossiisk, from where Kazakh crude could be loaded on tankers for its voyage to Samsun. In short, SCP is a win-win project for all concerned, a rarity in its part of the world.
SSL Home Copyright | Privacy Statement